The attack that worked
A reproducible walkthrough of each finding: the input, the tool call, and the action it triggered.
AI agent security testing.Find what it can reach before an attacker does.
Your agents do not just answer, they act: calling tools, holding credentials, moving data, triggering workflows. We test what an attacker could make them do through prompt injection, tool abuse, and excessive access, and hand your team the exact attack path and the fix.
Why now
The window from vulnerability discovery to exploitation has gone from weeks to hours.
On record
Same accreditations on every engagement.
CREST is the standard for offensive security execution. CERT-In, SOC 2 Type II, and ISO/IEC 27001 cover how SecureLayer7 handles your prompts, your agent topology, and your engagement record. Those testers have found 40,000+ vulnerabilities for 1,000+ companies across 30+ countries.
CREST
SOC 2 Type II
ISO/IEC 27001
The new blast radius
An agent is only as safe as what it can reach.
AI agents act on the world. They call tools, query databases, move money, and trigger workflows, usually with standing credentials and far more access than any single task needs. That is the exposure.
A single prompt injection, a poisoned document, or one compromised tool turns that access into an incident: data exfiltrated, records deleted, actions taken in your name. Model guardrails do not stop this, because the problem is not what the model says, it is what the agent is allowed to do.
The Agent Access Assessment
Six ways an agent gets turned against you.
An agent is not a chatbot. It reads untrusted input, holds credentials, calls tools, and acts on your systems. So the real question is not whether it can be jailbroken, but what it can be made to do, and how far it can go. We test the whole agent, its tools and connectors, its identity, and everything downstream, then prove the impact end to end.
- Prompt injection that becomes action
- Direct and indirect injection through user input, retrieved documents, web pages, tickets, and the output of other agents, aimed not at the chat window but at making the agent act. This is where guardrails fail quietly.
- Excessive agency
- The agent can do far more than the task needs, and consequential actions such as deleting data, moving money, changing access, or deploying can fire without a real human gate. This is the failure behind the agents that wiped production databases.
- Tool and permission abuse
- Whether an agent can be steered into calling a tool it should not, with parameters it should not, or reaching data outside its task. Least privilege is tested, not assumed.
- MCP and connector abuse
- The Model Context Protocol servers and connectors your agents plug into: tool poisoning, hidden instructions buried in tool descriptions, and connectors that quietly grant more than they should.
- Identity, secrets, and over-broad access
- Shared admin keys, over-scoped service accounts, and secrets reachable from the agent context. We test what an attacker gets the moment they steer or compromise the agent.
- Lateral movement and blast radius
- Once the agent is turned, we follow how far it actually reaches, into your databases, cloud, SaaS, and production, and hand your team the real business impact with the exact path that got there.
How we run it
Map. Attack. Prove.
SecureLayer7's offensive methodology.
Map
We inventory every agent, its tools, its credentials, and what each can reach, then draw the trust boundaries an attacker would target.
Attack
We drive injection, tool abuse, and privilege paths against the running system the way a real attacker would, chaining what we find.
Prove
Every finding ships with a working attack, the trust boundary that failed, and a fix your developers can implement. Then we re-test.
What arrives
Findings a developercan act on.
The trust boundary that failed
Exactly where untrusted input reached a privileged action, so you fix the cause, not the symptom.
A developer-ready fix
Concrete remediation per finding: scoping, guardrails, human-in-loop gates, and identity changes.
A re-test
We verify every fix against the running system, so you can show the path is closed.
Meet our expert
One named lead on every agent engagement.
John Dill
vCISO at SecureLayer7
40,000+
Vulnerabilities found
1,000+
Customers secured
14 yrs
Offensive research
John scopes each agent engagement against your tools, credentials, and data topology, then leads the pod from kickoff through final report and re-test. The people testing your agents are the same offensive researchers who publish CVEs, not tool operators, and John signs off on every finding with a working attack against the running system.
- Maps your agents, their tools, and their access before a single test runs.
- Owns kick-off, mid-engagement check-ins, and a live walkthrough of every finding.
- Drives remediation review and re-test until every tool and access path is closed.
Ready to test your agents? Book 30 minutes with John to walk through your tools, access, and timeline.
Book a 30-min callCommon questions
Agent security testing,asked often.
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Scope an engagement
Find out what your agents could be made to do.
We test your agents against the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications and hand your team the attack, the trust boundary that failed, and the fix, with a re-test to confirm it is closed.