CVE-2026-53460: Magick.NET (ImageMagick) AcquireAlignedMemory Policy Bypass DoS

# Trigger via any image format that routes through AcquireAlignedMemory
# with a size exceeding the policy cap (e.g. policy sets 256 MiB).
# A TIFF/BMP/etc. with crafted dimensions forces the oversized aligned alloc.

magick convert crafted_large.tiff /dev/null
# or via Magick.NET:
# using var image = new MagickImage("crafted_large.tiff");

# Relevant pre-patch code path in MagickCore/memory.c:
#
# BEFORE (vulnerable):
#   void *AcquireAlignedMemory(const size_t count, const size_t quantum)
#   {
#     size_t size = count * quantum;   // no max-memory-request check
#     return posix_memalign(..., size); // allocates whatever size is asked
#   }
#
# AFTER (patched, mirroring AcquireQuantumMemory / AcquireVirtualMemory):
#   void *AcquireAlignedMemory(const size_t count, const size_t quantum)
#   {
#     size_t size = count * quantum;
#     if (size > GetMaxMemoryRequest())  // <-- added policy gate
#       return NULL;                     // caller gets NULL, throws exception
#     return posix_memalign(..., size);
#   }